Catherine A. Meadows
Meadows helped show that formal protocol analysis can expose authentication and key-management flaws before a protocol is trusted in deployment.
Catherine A. Meadows is a cryptographer and formal-methods researcher at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory. Her work has focused on rigorous analysis of cryptographic protocols and the automated discovery of protocol flaws.
Making protocol assumptions testable
Meadows developed and advanced approaches that model protocol messages, attacker capabilities, and desired guarantees precisely. Such modeling makes it possible to test authentication and key-management claims instead of accepting them as intuitive.
High-assurance security
Her work on the NRL Protocol Analyzer and later formal-methods research has helped establish protocol verification as a practical part of security engineering and research.
Timeline
- 1981Receives a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign.
- 1985Joins the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.
- 1992Publishes formal analysis of a key-management protocol.
- 2011Co-edits the Dagstuhl report on security and rewriting.
Catherine A. Meadows
- Type
- Person
- Era
- 1980s-Present
- Known for
- NRL Protocol Analyzer; Formal protocol verification; Cryptographic protocol analysis
- Tags
- formal-methods, cryptographic-protocols, protocol-analysis, high-assurance-systems
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